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Abstract
We compute the rate of textual signals of risk of war recognizable in series of
consecutive political speeches about a disputed issue serious enough to entail an
international conflict. The speeches concern Iran’s nuclear program. We trace
textual signals forewarning of risks of war that reactions to this affair lead to. The
thrust of the textual analysis rests on the interplay of affiliation and power words
in continuous texts, following D. C. McClelland’s model for anticipating wars.
The speeches are those of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, US
Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton, Iranian Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,
and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Prefiguring a military confron-
tation before it occurs involves structuring information from unstructured data.
Despite such imperfect knowledge, by the end of January 2012, our results show
a receding risk of war on the Iranian side, but an increasing risk on the American
one, while remaining ambiguous on the Israeli one.
.................................................................................................................................................................................
Wars are like the uncontrollably complex soliton
waves. Solitons result from normal after-waves that
superpose one onto another to multiplicative effect
(Herman, 1992). Our matter concerns one of these
waves, the latent threats buried in speeches by polit-
ical elites about a disputed issue serious enough to
entail a risk of war. Our purpose is to recognise text-
ual signals prefiguring these threats in transnational
databases of texts. We centred on the speeches of
four political figures in Iran, Israel, and the USA
about Iran’s nuclear affair. For Iran, the figures
are the Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei
and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Iran’s is a
hybrid secular-clerical government (Hashemi and
Postel, 2011), a reason for analysing not one govern-
mental source of data, but two, Ayatollah Khamenei
on the clerical side and President Ahmadinejad
on the secular one. For now, clerical dominance re-
mains the rule (Dalton, 2010). The other figures
are Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, US
Department of State, and Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu of the State of Israel. The stakes justify the
present study.
It is not our job to like or dislike the Iranian
issue, which is our object, not our cause. In truth,
it is the words about the affair that are our object,
not the affair itself. Our job is (i) to concentrate
on political speeches related to the issue, (ii) use
empirical methods to sift and order the information
received and processed, and (iii) winnow from these
speeches recognizable signals about the risk of war.
At day’s end, our job is to reduce uncertainty by
foreshadowing what might happen before it hap-
pens, that is, by building up an index of risk of
war that changes before war breaks out. The
future may not be predictable. Some may not even
wish it to be predictable. ‘The idea of the future
being different from the present is so repugnant to
our conventional modes of thought and behaviour
that we, most of us, offer a great resistance to acting
Correspondence:
Robert L. Hogenraad,
IPSY - Institute of
Psychological Sciences,
Universite´ catholique
de Louvain, SSH/PSP,
Michotte/Socrate/Mercier,
Place du Cardinal
Mercier 10, bte L3.05.01,
1348 Louvain-la-Neuve,
Belgium.
E-mail:
robert.hogenraad@
uclouvain.be
Literary and Linguistic Computing  The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on
behalf of ALLC. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
1 of 15
doi:10.1093/llc/fqt015
 Literary and Linguistic Computing Advance Access published March 21, 2013
 by guest on M
arch 21, 2013
http://llc.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
on it in practice’ (Keynes, 1937, p. 13). Using reason
for forecasting human behaviours by looking for
signals of possible events is worthier than palm
reading to understand all that is unreasonable in
man. Every day, we use the words ‘expectation’,
‘yearning’, ‘curiosity’, ‘death’, which signal a deep
wish to peer into the future. A way to meet this wish
without getting the future wrong is to focus on ‘de-
grees of uncertainty about the future’ (Tetlock,
2005, p. 45) and indeed about the risk of war.
The good news is that ‘We can learn a great deal
about people’s underlying (. . .) motives by counting
and categorising the words they use to communicate’
(Newman et al., 2003, p. 666). This is not to say that
words of war or peace cause war or peace as a billiard
ball would hit another, for there is no causal logic
here. (Our concern is with a different logic, deeply
rooted in a motive imagery model to be expounded
later, one that points the way to a risk of war or a
chance of peace). Nor is it to say that we can predict
war or peace, or prove the risk of war, for the only
proven risk of war is war itself. Even troop build-ups,
a usually reasonable indicator, do not necessarily
lead to war. It is to say that we can point to risks of
war or peace from mere imperfect signals worth vigi-
lance, no matter how much hiding, misrepresenting,
or omitting the speeches contain. To make a signal of
risk of war appear through the batches of speeches
requires bringing them down to a single scale in a
time sequence and then isolating the signal. Yet,
whether issued from experts or from words, forecasts
do fail sometimes (Tetlock, 1999, 2005). On this side,
the problem is not only one of foreseeing risks. It is
also one of deciding which is more costly (in ex-
penses or in threat to lives): detecting a false signal
of a war in the making (causing expenses only) or
missing a true signal of a war in the making (causing
expenses and threat to lives). Even so, thinking there
is war when there is not could lead to problems like
anger or attacks, which may in turn cause a war.
In this vein, social scientists have exploited various
linguistic routes by raiding on words to look for sig-
nals of coming wars. Among the routes to analyse
threatening or non-threatening political texts are his-
torical accounts of collective memories (Garagozov,
2008, 2012; Wertsch, 2002) and media analysis
(Heinrich and Tanaev, 2009). Other tools include
dictionary-based linguistic indicators (Hogenraad
et al., 1995; Pennebaker et al., 2003), motives analysis
(Smith, 2008), associative measurements (Osgood,
1959), and stylistic indicators (Hart, 1984). Hart’s
DICTION (Hart and Lind, 2011), for example, is a dic-
tionary to analyse political rhetoric, ideology, and
style. Computer-readable dictionaries prevail for
assessing mood in extensive political documents
or in the media. Among mood dictionaries, there
are, for example, Young and Soroka’s (2012) LSD
(Lexicoder Sentiment Dictionary), Whissell’s
(2009) DAL (Dictionary of Affective Language), or
Pennebaker and Chung’s (2008) LIWC (Linguistic
Inquiry and Word Count). Finally, in a world
where visibility is dim, using automated coding of
texts to forecast events (Schrodt and Gerner, 2000)
holds a contributive place apart. Schrodt’s KEDS
(Kansas Event Data System) project relies on news
reports collated by news agencies: political event data
analysis includes cluster analysis procedures and
Markov chain models linking the distribution of pre-
sent and future states.
There is cause to wonder if we could ever read
the entirety of the speeches we analyse (1,187,404
words in the present corpus, Table 1, to be
Table 1 The corpus
Texts Divisions Total number
of words
No. of different
words
Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei 171 speeches over 47 months (3 January
2008 to 9 January 2012)
544,637 11,945
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 569 speeches over 42 months (14 March
2008 to 31 January 2012)
130,367 8,127
Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton 105 speeches over 34 months
(3 February 2009 to 10 January 2012)
173,894 8,373
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 202 speeches over 34 months (30 March
2009 to 1 February 2012)
338,506 12,826
R. L. Hogenraad and R. R. Garagozov
2 of 15 Literary and Linguistic Computing, 2013
 by guest on M
arch 21, 2013
http://llc.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
expounded later) and decide from our reading on
the risk of military confrontation contained in the
streams of data. Our purpose is to reveal a layer of
meaning buried in these speeches and to provide a
vision of possible risks of military confrontation
before it occurs, claiming no more than what the
texts themselves can support. In war matters, troops
and money usually count for far more than words.
Yet, some circumstances plead for the weight of
words in latent wars. For example, the existence
and use of precision weaponry (‘technological
multipliers’), like guided missiles, need few combat-
ants, so the usual forerunner signals of a war may be
less visible. Pre-emptive unconventional wars too—
biological, chemical, or cyber—may start without
massive forces, thus blurring the usual signals of
coming wars. The still unclaimed September 2010
version of the Stuxnet worm targeted Iranian indus-
trial installations connected to nuclear infrastruc-
tures. This event shows what cyberwar looks like
before leading up to a real war (Bronk, 2011).
Relying on the words available may in these cases
offer access to strategic intelligence that is otherwise
scanty. Another use for words is when the actors
of a war in the making deflect attention on war
preparations using deceptive smokescreens (Chung
and Pennebaker, 2011, p. 19). For example,
Chung and Pennebaker read a drop in President
G. W. Bush’s use of the pronoun ‘I’ just after 9/11
and again with Hurricane Katrina (August 2005) as
a way of shifting the attention from him. A last
example shows that warriors themselves reckon
with words. Preceding the August 2008 Russian
intervention in Georgia, denial-of-service web
attacks (not necessarily launched from Russia)
blinded the Georgian governmental websites, point-
ing to the imminence of action (Markoff, 2008).
1 The Motivational Root of
War and a Way to Assess the Risk
of War
To track down and codify how nations develop
patterns of violence over time, we took advantage
of McClelland’s (1975) motive imagery model. This
model rests on the need for achievement, the need
for affiliation, and the need for power. Only the need
for affiliation and the need for power form the
basis for McClelland’s model for forecasting wars.
Intimacy, friendship, our loves and attachments
define the need for affiliation. The will to have an
impact on people or to get control over them forms
the essential of the need for power. We best under-
stand affiliation and power by contrast with what
each is not for the other. One cannot love and be
in control of the other. That would be like looking
after a robot, predictable and obedient. In his chapter
9 ‘Love and power: the psychological basis of war’,
McClelland (1975, pp. 314–359) develops the notion
of ‘imperial motivation pattern’, which is the gap be-
tween a high need for power and a low need for af-
filiation. He shows how, in history, reformist zeal for
social justice, that is, the use of one’s own power to
save others, irrespective of whether they like it, is
often the link—not to be confused with the
cause—between the ‘imperial motivation pattern’
and later wars. The wider the gap, the greater the
risk of war. Consider, for example, President Harry
Truman’s (1947) ‘I believe that it must be the policy
of the United States to support free peoples who are
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities
or by outside pressures’. This aura of collective en-
thusiasm runs like a recurring theme before every
war, an axiom often running masked under the
guise of helpfulness: the use of one’s own power to
save others—call it the rage to convince—is often the
sign of wars to come. In Cioran’s (1998, p. 30) words,
‘One hardly saves a world without ruling it’.
All in all, the power-affiliation motive imagery
matters because it lays out a way of linking different
types of conflicts. This was a good enough reason to
turn McClelland’s view of the motivational root of
wars into a tool to assess the risk of war in continu-
ous texts, and use a procedure that guarantees the
same treatment for each document. We do not ask
judges to score speeches manually for the presence
or absence of motive imagery. Rather, we draw on
words of affiliation and words of power to build up
a motive imagery dictionary on McClelland’s
model. The dictionary is then loaded in a suite of
computerised content analysis programs set to carry
out the menial work.
So, how do we fare with the motivational roots of
war in assessing the risk of war? To test the truth of
Textual fingerprints of risk of war
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the dictionary that we built on McClelland’s model,
we analysed stories and real-life documents about
emerging conflicts. So far, we collated 36 corpora
totaling 4,169,687 words.1 We expected each of
these accounts to display similar profiles character-
ised by increases of the index of risk of war, that is,
an increasing gap between the need for power
(rising) and the need for affiliation (falling) before
the outbreak of the conflict. Among fictional mater-
ials (Hogenraad, 2003), William Golding’s (1954)
‘Lord of the Flies’ is emblematic of a peaceful start
giving way to a conflict. The novel relates the sur-
vival story of a group of boys who, after a plane
crash, set up a fragile community on a deserted
island. After initially enjoying their freedom, the
group soon divides into fearsome gangs, which
turn the paradise island into a nightmare of fears
and death. Chapter after chapter, the motive im-
agery indicator reliably tracks the emerging conflict
within the group. In Tolstoy’s (1997) ‘War and
Peace’, the epic story of a family life during the
Napoleonic wars from 1805 to 1812, the gap be-
tween the need for power and the need for affili-
ation increases linearly as expected. We extended
tests of the motive imagery dictionary to real-life
accounts of conflicts. In particular, we matched up
diplomatic documents preceding the outbreak
of past wars (Hogenraad, 2005, 2008) to the word-
based index of risk of war. We assessed the likeli-
hood of these past wars before they broke out.
Confirmation of a likely war occurred, for example,
in our analysis of the Anglo-American intervention
in Iraq using the speeches of President George W.
Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair from 11
September 2001 to 20 March 2003 (Hogenraad,
2005). We also confirmed a likely war in the analysis
of the speeches that preceded the military confron-
tation between Georgia and Russia of August 2008
(Hogenraad and Garagozov, 2010). Over the year
2008, the risk of war was increasing in the speeches
of President Medvedev of Russia. That risk was
increasing too among US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice and European leaders. But the
risk of war was decreasing in the speeches of
President Saakashvili. The grudging conciliatoriness
of President Saakashvili seemingly contradicted
his final twist when he finally rushed to war. Yet
appeasement turned out to be a correct estimate
of the risk of war when it appeared Saakashvili
had perhaps been trapped into a war he did not
want (Popjanevski, 2009, pp. 153–155).
For their part, Chung and Pennebaker (2011)
reviewed the usefulness of the motive imagery
model to screen out threatening communications
that they define as ‘explicit planning of an aggressive
action while at the same time concealing the
planned action from the target’ (p. 18). One can
begin, they continue, to appreciate how word
counts can betray intentions and future actions
(p. 19). And intentions are what motive imagery
hits on. Using trained human scorers, Smith et al.
(2008; see also Winter, 2011) found increased levels
of power imagery and lower levels of integrative
complexity in terrorist groups than in non-terrorist
groups. Frisch (2010) found that both integrative
complexity (Suedfeld and Tetlock, 1977) and
motive imagery measures were in accordance to
predict intents of the actors of the August 2008
Russian intervention in Georgia. There are also
measures of affiliation and power to explore the
First Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords of 1993
(Tripscha et al., 2006).
2 The Embarrassment of
Ambiguity: In Praise of Vagueness
It may not have been lost on observers of language
that the vagueness of language gnaws away at the
credibility of textual analyses. By vagueness, we
mean a language that evokes no specific facts or
knowledge, and suggests an unwillingness to com-
municate clearly (Empson, 2004; Pe´ladeau, 2005).
Vague and evasive words defeat clarity indeed. But
there is another way to see vagueness that does not
give it a bad name. What tells against a negative
view is the sense in which ambiguity can be pro-
ductive because it allows ideas to evolve. At the
moment an idea is molded into a frozen form like
an overspecific word, it is drained and less likely to
lead to innovative solutions in negotiation, as when
discussing a draft agreement for example (Doonan
and Foster, 2001, p. 97). In ‘The Ambiguity
Advantage’, Wilkinson (2006) has described a
R. L. Hogenraad and R. R. Garagozov
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progression running from ambiguity, risk, vague-
ness, confusion down to chaos. But he shows also
how leaders can use ambiguity, lead others through
chaos, and create opportunities for them.
The question of vagueness is way beyond the
prospect of this study. Besides, broaching the rate
of stylistic vagueness, that is, words with a diffuse
meaning (Sebeok, 1960, pp. 370–371), in the ana-
lysis of the content of textual data brings a confu-
sion of levels. Yet different levels can sometimes be
brought into useful confrontation. We had to make
a point, but we are still in need of a corrective. On
one side, we did not enter vague words in the
motive imagery dictionary. Vague expressions like
more or less, somewhat, aspect, something, and so on
fill everyday language, which only the context of
situation can clear up (Malinowski, 1935, p. 11).
On the other side, there are other ways, besides
vague words, for ambiguity to sneak into language,
like calculated ambivalences, insinuations, or dubi-
ous wordplays as used in racist and populist
speeches (Wodak, 2003, 2007, p. 217). Even the
‘war on terror’ label remains vague in the 9/11 con-
text (Reese and Lewis, 2009), whereas its parts enter
in the motive imagery dictionary. As Orwell (1981,
p. 167) said ‘When the general atmosphere is bad,
language must suffer’. In truth, the quasi-opposites
of vagueness, that is, dogmatism, authoritarianism,
or certainty, more often caught the attention of
social scientists on the idea that one could not
achieve one without failing the other. Hart (1984;
Hart and Lind, 2011), Rokeach (1960), and indeed
Ertel (1972) are among those who dug at dogma-
tism. Hart set up a computer-aided text analysis
with dictionary (DICTION). One subcategory of
DICTION, CERTAINTY, taps words expressed with
full authority (crowd, army, fully, always, for
example). From this set, another set of words
expressing ambiguity is subtracted (somewhere,
perhaps, seems, for example) to draw a final score
of CERTAINTY. Incidentally, one notices a partial
overlap between entries such as crowd or army in
the COLLECTIVES subcategory of DICTION and the NEED
FOR POWER category of the motive imagery
dictionary.
The imperfect solution we devised, not to correct
but to evaluate the rate of vagueness in our serial
data, is this. We brought to bear Hiller’s (1971)
Communication Vagueness Scale to follow the rate
of vagueness in the series of speeches. In this way,
unable to get away with ambiguity, we could at least
keep an eye on it. To put it simply, in a high-strung
interplay, one would expect the language of a party
open to settlement to contain more and more vague
and evasive words, leaving doors open. And one
would expect the opposite from a party resolved
to reject negotiation, that is, a language with fewer
and fewer ambiguous words, leaving no chance for
ideas to evolve, or to repeat them in slightly differ-
ent versions. This is what we found in the analysis of
the communications that preceded the conflict be-
tween Georgia and the Russian Federation (January
to August, 2008) over the separatist regions of
Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia (Hogenraad and
Garagozov, 2010, p. 22). President Saakashvili was
open to negotiate with the separatist regions; his
statements contained an increasing number of
vague words over time, not unlike a strategy of sur-
vival. President Medvedev on the contrary was
determined on the Georgian question and his state-
ments were gaining in precision.
To sum up, we have a purpose (detecting signals
of coming war or appeasement) equipped with
proper tools (prevision-oriented dictionaries), a
procedure (computer-aided content analysis), and
data (political speeches transferred from official
web sites) we will present soon. The tools are the
motive imagery dictionary detailed to make the risk
of war or the chance of appeasement emerge from
the data, and the vagueness dictionary detailed to
evaluate the rate of vagueness in the statements.
3 Method
3.1 Texts
We summarise in Table 1 the database of speeches
(1,187,404 words) in the English translations avail-
able. We indexed the speeches for their day, month,
and year of production. We suspended collating the
series of speeches after January 2012. We collated
the speeches of Ayatollah Khamenei from the web
site of the Supreme Leader of Iran (Supreme Leader
of Iran, Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, All
speeches). We collated the speeches of President
Textual fingerprints of risk of war
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Ahmadinejad from the web site of the Iranian
Presidency (President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, All
speeches). The first speech with mention of Iran by
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in the new Obama
administration was on 3 February 2009 (Secretary of
State Hillary R. Clinton, All speeches). Finally, we
started collating the data of Prime Minister
Netanyahu with his speech of 30 March 2009
(Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, All speeches).
3.2 Computer-aided content analysis,
motive imagery dictionary, and
vagueness dictionary
We enter the texts in consecutive order, with codes
to slice the texts. We then run a computer-aided
content analysis procedure, PROTAN (for PROTocol
ANalyzer) (Hogenraad et al., 1995), to trawl the
data using computer-readable dictionaries orga-
nised into hierarchical categories. Computer-aided
content analysis itemises and orders words into lists
and numbers. The procedure involves entering,
pruning declensions and verb forms, arranging
texts into frequency tables and then looking for
matches between words in a dictionary and words
in a text. One then counts the number of word
matches in the categories, and takes the percentage
of the number of matches in each category.
Dictionaries can be of two types, category-based
and norm-based. Both types are useful assets for
the humanities and the study of natural language.
Category-based dictionaries rest on some theory
that they embody (Wilson, 2011). Norm-based
ones refer to some semantic property like concrete-
ness or emotions. Building dictionaries of either
type is time-consuming. Vincze and Bestgen
(2011) have recently developed and validated a
new automatic procedure for expanding lexical
norms by analysing co-occurrences in texts. With
adaptations, their procedure could be extended to
category-based dictionaries (Y. Bestgen, personal
communication).
The category-based motive imagery dictionary
(version 6.0, 2012) is a database of needs for affili-
ation (837 entries, English words and roots) and
needs for power (1724 entries) (Table 2). The dic-
tionary is designed so any word assigned to one
category cannot be present in another one except
in its superordinate category. For example, in
Table 2, the entry sweetheart in subcategory
AFFECTION can be assigned only to the higher up cat-
egory of AFFILIATION and to no other one. The text
words being set in alphabetical order, each text word
is then compared with the dictionary entries also set
alphabetically, until a match is found. The matches
are then recorded, summed, and averaged over the
unit chosen (by month in the present study).
Lastly, we quantified how much vagueness
there was in our documents, using Hiller’s
Communication Vagueness Scale (Hiller et al.,
1969; Hiller, 1971). The scale comprises 362 vague
words and expressions (aspect, function, factor, more
or less, about, sort of, you know, considerations, many,
process, variety, situation, very). For clarity, these
words are ordered into 10 categories of vagueness
such as AMBIGUOUS DESIGNATION, APPROXIMATION,
INDEFINITE AMOUNT, MULTIPLICITY, and others
Table 2 Affiliation and power categories of the motive
imagery dictionary (V 6.0, 2012)
Category Subcategory No. of
entries
Examples
Affiliation 843
Affection 105 Mate, sweetheart
Social behavior 87 Answer, escort
Affiliation 473 Accompany,
courteous
Affect loss 34 Alone, indifference
Affect participants 61 Dad, mistress
Affect words 41 Family, nostalgic
Positive affect 43 Affable, thoughtful
Power 1,769
Power 984 Ambition, justice
Power gain 48 Emancipate,
nominate
Power loss 65 Captive, weak
Power ends 12 Plead, recommend
Power conflicts 269 Adversary, invade
Power cooperation 68 Arbiter, reciprocal
Power authoritative
participants
99 Patriarch, detective
Power ordinary
participant
28 Emissary, orator
Power doctrine 27 Conservatism,
dogma
Power authority 36 Legitimate, reign
Residual power
words
133 Colonialism,
terrorize
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(Pe´ladeau, 2005). There is no semantic homogeneity
in the scale we used, with permission (J. H. Hiller,
personal communication), to assess vagueness in
our documents. We computed a global rate of
vagueness from the vagueness scale (the percentage
of the number of vague words to the total number
of words in the section of the document under ana-
lysis). Hiller’s scale detected item clarity in question-
naires (Ford et al., 2000). The scale also correlated
with writing quality in students’ essays (Hiller et al.,
1969). Authors used Hiller’s scales to evaluate the
efficacy of teaching programs (Land, 1981) and the
effect of discourse markers on reading comprehen-
sion (Chaudron and Richard, 1986). Another use
of Hiller’s procedure has been as a cognitive aid
for improving information communication and
for helping information processing in psychological
treatment (Rosenthal and Downs, 1985). Eventually,
vagueness scales could be applied profitably to evalu-
ate the quality of scientific writing (Hogenraad
et al., 1992). Because vagueness characterises style
and not content, it can be extended from its
origin in education to other kinds of written docu-
ments, political for example.
4 Results
Statistical treatments comprise (i) removing auto-
correlations, (ii) regression and resampling statis-
tics, and (iii) identifying cutoff-points in the
regression profiles. (i) Speeches of any political
figure carry traces of previous speeches by the
same figure. To ensure independent observations,
we randomise data. It is impossible to randomise
textual data because the temporal order is part of
the information carried by them: serial texts im-
pinge on one another. Dependencies in the tem-
poral order of texts create apparent changes
without genuine ones. We remove the systematic
dependency in the temporal series (autocorrelation)
from the data (Hogenraad et al., 1997). (ii) Because
texts are unrepeatable events, one cannot analyse the
sampling error. It then becomes necessary to simu-
late observations we do not have using those we
have. To evaluate how stable is the statistical esti-
mator, we ran systematically 20,000 bootstrapped
simulations of the regressions to capture the confi-
dence region of the boundary values of unique text-
ual data (Diaconis and Efron, 1983; Hogenraad and
McKenzie, 1999). The bootstrap method we used is
part of SimStat for Windows (Pe´ladeau, 1996).
(iii) Under the seemingly smooth increases or de-
creases of risk of war, we want to know if there are
turning points (waterfalls or cliffs) hidden in the
time sequences. We used the CART (Classification
and Regression Trees) non-parametric procedure
(Breiman et al., 1993; Efron and Tibshirani, 1991)
of statistical decision-making that hierarchically
splits data into progressively smaller turning
points. Unlike single change-point tests (Siegel and
Castellan, 1988), CART identifies several such points,
building trees by recursive statistical decisions
(McKenzie and Low, 1992). The result is a hierarch-
ical structure in which each discontinuity reveals a
transition within the time trend.
4.1 Average risk of war
The average rate of risk of war in Ahmadinejad is 3.5
(min/max¼ 1.4/5.9, SD¼ 1.6, N¼ 42). In
Khamenei, the rate is 1.3 (min/max¼0.6/3.4,
SD¼ 1.0, N¼ 47). In Netanyahu, the rate is 1.0
(min/max¼2.4/0.3, SD¼ 0.6, N¼ 34). Lastly, in
Clinton, the rate is 0.7, (min/max¼2.7/5.2,
SD¼ 1.7, N¼ 34). The two extremes on a scale of
average risk are Prime Minister Netanyahu and
President Ahmadinejad. The average rate of risk
for Ahmadinejad is way above that of the other pol-
itical figures, even of Khamenei.
4.2 The course of the risk of war
The risk of war (Table 3) is receding linearly and
significantly in the speeches of Ayatollah Khamenei
(Fig. 1). President Ahmadinejad (Fig. 2) too relents,
then does not, releasing a new energy in his speeches.
The meaning of Figures 1 and 2 is that a change is
taking place. In Khamenei, the mean speed of risk of
war decreases at the slow rate of 0.02 (; Table 3) a
month. In Ahmadinejad, the mean speed of risk of
war decreases at the rate of 0.15 until month 28
included (November 2010) after which the speed in-
creases at the slow rate of 0.002 until month 42
(January 2012). The trend toward making terms per-
sists on the Iranian side in a way that it does not
Textual fingerprints of risk of war
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elsewhere. Yet the sometimes unbecoming style
of both Ayatollah Khamenei and President
Ahmadinejad had made us expect changes in the op-
posite direction. With the noted decreasing trends, in
both of them we found change-points inside the
trends. In the Khamenei series, we found a shift
down separating the period before January 2010
(month 24) (M¼ 1.6, n¼ 24, SD¼ 0.9) from that
after (month 25, February 2010) (M¼ 0.9, n¼ 23,
SD¼ 0.9). In the Ahmadinejad series, we identified
a similar shift down, before August 2009 (month 15)
(M¼ 4.2, n¼ 15, SD¼ 0.9) and after (month 16,
September 2009) (M¼ 3.0, n¼ 25, SD¼ 0.7).
The course of the risk of war in the speeches of
Secretary of State Clinton (Table 3 and Fig. 3) rises
linearly and significantly. This is a reverse direction
to that of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad. In her
speeches, the mean speed of risk of war increases at
the rate of 0.06 a month. (By comparison, the mean
speed of risk of war in the speeches of Prime Minister
Blair before the Anglo-American intervention
in Iraq was 0.02 a month over 72 months;
Hogenraad, 2005, Fig. 3, p. 147). The increasing
risk of war in Secretary Clinton’s speeches comes as
a surprise, considering the low rate of risk at the
start—from a low point of 2.57 on month 1, to a
high point of 0.13 on month 34. We ferreted out a
first upward cutoff-point before May 2010
(M¼1.5, n¼ 15, SD¼ 0.1) and after May 2010
(month 16) (M¼0.05, n¼ 19, SD¼ 1.6).
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Fig. 1 The risk of war as assessed from the speeches of Ayatollah Khamenei (3 January 2008 to 9 January 2012)
(N¼ 47 months). Distribution of Ayatollah Khamenei’s speeches per month: 2008, months 1–12; 2009, months 13–23;
2010, months 24–35; 2011, months 36–46; 2012, month 47
Table 3 Risk of war: summary of statistical results (95%  confidence intervals are based on 20,000 resamplings
Id R2 df F   CIs 95%
A. Khamenei 0.10 1,45 5.1* 0.023 0.04/0.001 linear
M. Ahmadinejada 0.29 2,37 7.5** 0.145 0.2/0.06 linear
0.002 0.0007/0.004 quadratic
H. R. Clinton 0.14 1,32 5.1* 0.06 0.01/0.3 linear
B. Netanyahub 0.06 1,31 2.0 (ns) 0.01 0.007/0.03 linear
aTwo outliers.
bOne outlier.
*P< 0.05; **P< 0.01.
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We found a secondary downward shift within the
first subperiod, before (M¼1.0, n¼ 9, SD¼ 0.9)
and after November 2009 (month 9) (M¼2.1,
n¼ 6, SD¼ 0.5). Finally, the course of the risk
of war in the speeches of Prime Minister
Netanyahu is not statistically significant (Fig. 4)
and shows no turning point. That does not mean
the lack of statistical significance is meaningless or in-
conclusive. The absence of direction gives away the
uncertainty associated with the expressed motives of
the Israeli Prime Minister, which is informative in
itself.
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Fig. 3 The risk of war as assessed from the speeches of Secretary Clinton (3 February 2009 to 10 January 2012)
(N¼ 34 months). Distribution of Secretary Clinton’s speeches per month: 2009, months 1–10; 2010, months 11–22;
2011, months 23–33; 2012, month: 34
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Fig. 2 The risk of war as assessed from the speeches of President Ahmadinejad (14 March 2008 to 31 January
2012) (N¼ 42 months). Distribution of President Ahmadinejad’s speeches per month: 2008, months 1–9; 2009,
months 10–19; 2010, months 20–30; 2011, months 31–41; 2012, month 42
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4.3 The course of the rate of vagueness
The average rate of vagueness is 6.7 in Ahmadinejad
(min/max¼ 0/7.8, SD¼ 1.2, N¼ 42), 8.7 in
Khamenei (min/max¼ 8/9.5, SD¼ 0.3, N¼ 47),
7.6 in Netanyahu (min/max¼ 6.4/8.4, SD¼ 0.4,
N¼ 34), and 7.4 in Clinton (min/max¼ 6.1/9.2,
SD¼ 0.6, N¼ 34). The course of the rate of vague-
ness increases linearly and significantly in
Ahmadinejad, Clinton, and Netanyahu (but not
Khamenei) (Table 4 and Figs 5–7). The speed of
increase is slow in each data set, between 0.02 and
0.03 a month. The course of vagueness in
Netanyahu adds up to the absence of direction
noted earlier for the risk of war: his speeches
remain in a lasting state of vagueness throughout.
We further bothered to find correlations between
the risk of war and the rate of vagueness. We
found only one, in Clinton’s speeches, a statistically
significant lagged one between the risk of war at T0
and the rate of vagueness at Tþ1 (r¼ 0.66, n¼ 33,
p< 0.0001, CI 95%¼ 0.37/0.86 using 20,000 resam-
plings). Changes in the risk of war in Clinton are
followed in proportion by changes in the rate of
vagueness one month later.
5 Discussion
War is an event of many layers and its beginnings
are always invisible to the naked eye. We relied on
the motive imagery model to enlarge our vision of
risk while the usual signals of war are still hardly
noticeable. To come to this, we assessed how the
ratio of power to affiliation imagery that shapes
the risk of war spread through the speeches over
time. For now, the trends of risk of war in the
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Fig. 4 The risk of war as assessed from the speeches of Prime Minister Netanyahu (30 March 2009 to 1 February 2012)
(N¼ 34 months days). Distribution of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s speeches per month: 2009, months 1–10; 2010,
months 11–21; 2011, month 22–32; 2012, months 33–34
Table 4 Vagueness of style: summary of statistical results (95%  confidence intervals are based on 20,000 resamplings)
Id R2 df F   CIs 95%
A. Khamenei 0.002 1,45 0.09 (ns) 0.001 0.005/0.007 linear
M. Ahmadinejada 0.14 1,39 6.2* 0.02 0.005/0.03 linear
H. R. Clinton 0.21 1,32 8.5** 0.03 0.005/0.05 linear
B. Netanyahu 0.18 1,32 7.1* 0.02 0.004/0.03 linear
aOne outlier.
*P< 0.05; **P< 0.01.
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speeches of Ayatollah Khamenei, and, with a
nuance, of President Ahmadinejad, chart a cautious
course toward appeasement. The reversal of the sign
of the trend after the 28th month in Ahmadinejad—
he is not all easing—hints he is not indifferent to
external pressures. But this minor dissonance con-
firms the otherwise general pattern toward
settlement. On the other hand, the rising trend of
risk of war in the speeches of Secretary of State
Clinton flags foreseeing a persisting enforcement
of pressures on Iran. A warning bell, and maybe
more. The Israeli speeches keep their ambiguous
line, indeed as if entangled in conflicting forces.
Risks of war are analysable and workable, but this
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Fig. 6 The rate of vagueness in the speeches of Secretary Clinton (3 February 2009 to 10 January 2012)
(N¼ 34 months). Distribution of Secretary Clinton’s speeches per month: 2009, months 1–10; 2010, months 11–22;
2011, months 23–33; 2012, month: 34
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Fig. 5 The rate of vagueness in the speeches of President Ahmadinejad (14 March 2008 to 31 January 2012)
(N¼ 42 months). Distribution of President Ahmadinejad’s speeches per month: 2008, months 1–9; 2009,
months 10–19; 2010, months 20–30; 2011, months 31–41; 2012, month 42
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ambiguity as lack of visibility is not. Just the same, it
is difficult to imagine that words bear no relation
to events.
Playing martial language against vagueness of
language, we noticed the rate of vagueness increased
in Ahmadinejad, Clinton, and Netanyahu. But the
context of the increases does not mean the same for
each of them. Being vague in Iran is not the same
as being vague in Washington or Jerusalem. On one
side, a martial language like Clinton’s, woven
with signals of ambiguity, looks like a paradoxical
blurred show of confidence. This view is reinforced
by the solid lagged correlation in Clinton’s speeches
between risk of war and rate of vagueness one
month later. On the other side, an appeasing lan-
guage like Ahmadinejad’s, woven with more signals
of ambiguity, is coherent. Beyond these nuances,
vagueness that leaves doors open is helpful in a dis-
pute, even on the Israeli side. At any rate, one would
have more to fear from the opposite, that is, an
increasingly martial language woven with a decreas-
ing rate of vagueness locking the stance of the dis-
putants. The speeches of President Medvedev in the
August 2008 intervention in Georgia (Hogenraad
and Garagozov, 2010, p. 22) are a case in point.
Ultimately, what we cared about was to fore-
shadow a risk of war from political speeches. We
used a measure of vagueness to modulate that evalu-
ation of risk. With this, we have reached the limit of
what one can do to warn of a risk of war using only
words. What comes out is that codifying words of
motive imagery as links—not causes—prefiguring
wars in the making led us to recognise an undeni-
able risk. However partial this knowledge, we
cannot know what knowledge may be useful in the
future, except as an inducement to think about con-
flicts through the words of the other. At least known
risks can be handled. It is always the unknown,
writes Robert Harris (2011, p. 49) (in his recent
novel about an automated computer-content ana-
lysis artifact run amok!), that is most frightening.
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